

The Influence of Domestic and External Environment on Philippine Foreign Policy Changes: US Eviction in 1991, and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement

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ABSTRACT

The changes of foreign policy directives of the Philippines towards its alliance with the United States of America after Mt. Pinatubo eruption, and typhoon Haiyan are interesting cases to analyze. The United States was forced to move out of the Philippines after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, while Washington signed a defense agreement with Manila to have a rotational presence in Philippine military bases after typhoon Haiyan. Using foreign policy analysis, specifically by tapping the influence of domestic and external factors on Manila's foreign policy decision making, the research would explain why after similar natural disasters, the Philippines opted not to ratify another treaty for the maintenance of the US bases in 1991, while allowing the US to use Philippine military bases after typhoon Haiyan in 2014. Though given similar disaster circumstances, the disaster itself have only short-term significance in the decision making process. After Mt. Pinatubo eruption, the impact of the end of the Cold War (external environment) together with the growing Filipino nationalist sentiments (domestic environment) has influenced the Philippines to deny the US a continued presence of its military base. Meanwhile, the US pivot to Asia in 2011 (external environment), and Aquino's military modernization and external balancing towards the rise of China (domestic environment) have dictated the Philippines decision to allow the US to have a presence once again, in Philippine military bases.

Key words: US-Philippine Alliance, Domestic-External Influences, Foreign policy changes

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Philippines, being situated in the Pacific Ring of Fire, is not new to natural disasters such as typhoons and volcanic eruptions. In the month of June in the year 1991, the Philippines witnessed the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which was considered as the second largest volcanic eruption of the century. Meanwhile, on the fateful day of November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) had made landfall in the central provinces of the Philippines. The typhoon was recorded as the strongest typhoon that had made landfall in history. Interesting enough is what happened between Manila and Washington's military relationship after those disasters. A year after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, the United States formally closed down Clark Airfield in Pampanga, Philippines, enumerating the damage caused by the eruption as one of the reasons for closing down¹. On the other hand, the presence of United States military forces in the relief operations in typhoon Haiyan has augmented support for further US-Philippine military cooperation². Former Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario even stated that the presence of United States military forces in the relief operations prove that the Philippines needs the United States for strengthening its defense capabilities. It is no wonder why five months after typhoon Haiyan, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), between the two countries was signed, and was upheld by the Philippine Supreme Court on January 2016³.

The study seeks to clarify why despite having similar natural disasters circumstances; there was still a difference in foreign policy outcomes. It will argue that the disaster itself has a minimal influence in such foreign policy changes, and it was both the domestic and external environment that led the Philippines to reject another treaty from the United States after Mt. Pinatubo, while, agreed to have the United States a rotational presence in Philippine bases after

¹ Cabie, H. Blanco. "Pinatubo tilts US interest away from RP's military base." *Philippine Architecture, Engineering & Construction Record*, 1991: 12-13.

² Lum, Thomas, and Rhoda Margesson. *Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda): U.S. and International Response to Philippines Disaster*. Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014.

³ Parameswaran, Prashanth. *US-Philippines Alliance to Reach 'New Level': US Defense Chief*. April 10, 2016. <http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/us-philippines-alliance-to-reach-new-level-us-defense-chief/>.

typhoon Haiyan. Years before the Mt. Pinatubo eruption there were already ongoing talks between Manila and Washington on the maintenance of the US bases, particularly the Clark Airbase in Angeles City, and the Subic Naval base in Olongapo province. Maintaining the bases in the Philippines were getting less importance even within the US government since their usefulness was already diminished after the end of the cold war. Likewise, the growing nationalist sentiments in the Philippines supported by majority of the Senators were also becoming a hindrance for the maintenance of the bases in Philippine territory. On the other hand before typhoon Haiyan hit the Philippines in 2013, the United States under President Obama has announced its pivot or “rebalancing” of Asia in 2011 – an effort to contain the continued rise of China as a power in the region. In doing so, the United States would need every help it would get from its Asia-Pacific allies, one of which is the Philippines. Incidentally, the Philippines was stuck in a territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea, and was in need of support primarily from its strongest and oldest treaty ally, the United States.

Significance of the Study

The study has both practical and theoretical significance. In a changing environment, wherein a natural catastrophe is as fatal as a terrorist attack, it is imperative to address these problems with the highest priorities. In light with this, the study dwells on practical significance by tapping the disaster factor, as an agent that can influence security relations between two countries. The disaster diplomacy framework which states that disasters catalyzes negotiations among conflicting parties gives light to the notion that disaster do affect certain negotiations in the short term given that there is a preexisting basis for such negotiations⁴. In the same way, the study gains theoretical significance by looking into the interchange of both external and domestic factors in determining a certain foreign policy outcome.

⁴Kelman, I. *Disaster Diplomacy: How Disasters affect peace and conflict*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Research Questions

Main Question

How did external and domestic factors influence and affected the decision of the Philippines to evict the United States from Subic Bay in 1991, while agreed to sign the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in 2014?

Sub-questions

- What are the specific external and domestic events that affected the decisions of the Philippines?
- How did the disaster shape the foreign policy process of the Philippines?

Thesis Statement

The research would argue that external and domestic factors affected the Philippines' foreign policy decision to evict the United States in 1991, and then agree to have enhanced defense cooperation in 2014 in a way that these factors intertwined with each other to suit the interest of the Philippines during those times. Using Herrmann's model of foreign policy change, one can see how the Philippine interest shifted because of both the external and domestic environments in the alliance. In the case after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, aside from the damages that it caused to Clark Airfield, the United States was in a dilemma for the continued presence of the bases primarily because there was a diminished usefulness of the bases since the end of the Cold War. Meanwhile, the growing nationalists sentiments of the Filipinos has led to a protest asking the US to leave the Philippines permanently which ends into a senate led vote that permanently banned the use of US military bases. In the case after typhoon Haiyan, the United States has announced its pivot to Asia Policy in 2011, refocusing its attention to the Asia-Pacific region by primarily tapping on its Asian allies, one of which is the Philippines. Taking advantage of this external phenomenon, Filipino president Benigno Aquino III became vocal for the implementation of a modernization act of the country's military and needs the full support of Washington as external balancing move to face the issues in the South China Sea. One can observe that despite the similar background of natural disasters, there were two different foreign policy outcomes because what really affected the decision making process was the external and

domestic environment in the Philippines. The disasters merely catalyzed the negotiation process between Manila and Washington, and do not really have significant influence to both cases.

Scope and Limitations

In maximizing the strengths of the study, this thesis would dwell on the scope of US-Philippine relations in the aspects military and strategic relations. More specifically, it will focus on the Philippine side of the alliance. The study limits its parameters by not discussing other aspects of US-Philippine relations such as economic exchanges, and people-to-people exchanges. Likewise, the study would limit itself into discussing previous agreements between the United States and the Philippines, aside from those necessary for the two cases. In a theoretical sense, the study would look unto the interchange of both domestic and external environment and how it shaped two different outcomes under the same conditions. More so, the study would only tackle two foreign policy change factors as suggested by Herrmann⁵. In this way, the study would be narrow enough to yield strong theoretical conclusions.

Research Design and Methodology

Research Design

The study will utilize a case study research design. In doing so, the study would look not just into the similarities and differences between the cases selected, but also in the continuity of them. In such a way, the study would find the necessary focal point of analysis, specifically, on why given a similar situation, different results happened in the cases selected respectively.

Research Materials

The study would make use of both print and non-print resource materials. Print materials necessary for the study include books, journals, news articles, government releases, and other similar forms of media. Non-print materials are those interviews the researcher would facilitate

⁵Herrmann, Charles. "When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990: 3-21.

with key resource persons from different sectors such as the government, academe, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Research Procedures

The procedures of this research would mainly focus on collecting evidences to support its claims. Since it is a qualitative research, archival and library data gatherings would be done, likewise with the support of interviews from key resource persons. In a similar fashion, process tracing, and data triangulation from print materials, interviews, and government releases would be done to further strengthen the merits and claims of the research.

To explain the effects of external influences, the researcher would analyze key materials from the US government, such reports and studies since the actions of the United States primarily affects the external environment of Philippine defense strategy. Meanwhile, for the domestic influences, the resources would mainly dwell on local materials and interviews. To add more depth to the study, key interviews with people from the academia, government, and NGOs would be done and counter check their statements with print materials.

In analyzing the intertwining effect of external and domestic factors, the research would depend on the findings of Herrmann on how these kind of factors intertwine and affects a country's foreign policy decisions.

CHAPTER II

External – Domestic Influences in Foreign Policy

Going deeper into the discussion of the research, this chapter looks into the primacy of the interchange of external and domestic influences in foreign policy decision making. The research argues that in the given cases, despite the similarity of a natural disaster background, what really influenced the foreign policy decision making process of the Philippines was the external and domestic environment that it was set upon. This chapter would elaborate on that further by reviewing previous literatures, likewise revisiting previous studies on alliances, disaster diplomacy, and United States – Philippine relations. More so, the strengths of the theoretical framework of this research would be discussed in this chapter.

Literature Review on Disaster Diplomacy

The first book on disaster diplomacy was the book *“Disaster Diplomacy: How Disasters affect peace and conflict”* by I. Kelman (2012). In the volume, Kelman (2012) started defining what, and how disaster diplomacy takes place in various inter, and intra state conflicts. The book cites a number of case studies, in which it examines how and why disasters affect or do not affect peace and reduce conflict. The book found that there is no evidence to support that disaster diplomacy is a vital factor in conflict resolution⁶. Instead, Kelman suggests that disaster-related activities have a short-term influence on conflict resolution, provided that there is an existing non-disaster related basis for reconciliation. The theoretical findings of the book support the situation wherein adversarial states are bounded by a disaster. However, it does not give a clear perspective on how disaster diplomacy affects the diplomacy between two allied states.

In a study conducted by Gaillard, Kelman, & Orillos⁷, they looked unto the US-Philippine military relations in the disaster diplomacy perspective. In studying the case of the

⁶ Kelman, I. *Disaster Diplomacy: How Disasters affect peace and conflict*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

⁷ Gaillard, Jean-Christophe, Ilan Kelman, and Ma. Fiorina Orillos. "US-Philippines Military Relations After the Mt Pinatubo Eruption in 1991: A Disaster Diplomacy Perspective." *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 2009: 301-330.

1991 Mt. Pinatubo eruption, it has concluded that the damages to the US military bases in Clark Airfield Pampanga, and in Subic Bay Naval base, have little effect on the negotiations between Manila and Washington with regards to closing down these bases. However, the United States unilaterally closed down Clark Airfield citing the damages caused by the Mt. Pinatubo as one of the reasons. One can find certain theoretical strengths in this study. First, it chooses a case in which disaster diplomacy was put into perspective in analyzing the negotiations between two allied countries – the United States and the Philippines. Second, the case selection proves the findings of Kelman (2012) that disaster related activities, have a short term influence in negotiations, and that non disaster related issues already exist between the negotiating parties. Even before the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, Manila and Washington are already in constant talks to bring an end to the presence of US military bases in the Philippines. The Mt. Pinatubo eruption only influenced the negotiations in a short-term basis, in which it was cited by the United States as one of the reason in unilaterally closing down Clark Airfield. Though the study has its theoretical findings, it fails to look on how foreign aid and assistance can yield certain diplomatic gains. In strictly trying to put the Mt. Pinatubo eruption in the perspective of disaster diplomacy, it did not look unto the assistance and aid given by the United States to the Philippines and its effects in negotiation regarding the US bases.

The variety of literature regarding humanitarian foreign aid dwells on the gains and motives of the donor country towards the recipient country⁸. It suggests that the number of foreign humanitarian aids is most of the time driven by strategic and political motivations toward the recipient country and not on the sole purpose of altruism and humanitarian purposes⁹. The study conducted by Paik took a different approach and look unto the attitude of the recipient country towards humanitarian foreign aid. He compared the authoritarian regimes of Myanmar and China regarding the attitudes of both regimes in following the disaster brought by Cyclone Nargis, and the Sichuan earthquake in the year 2008. He concluded that China was more open to humanitarian foreign aid than Myanmar, because the former does not suffer from high risk of regime instability caused by the presence of foreign aid workers¹⁰. Unlike China, Myanmar faces

⁸ Paik, W. "Authoritarianism and humanitarian aid: regime stability and external relief in China and Myanmar." *The Pacific Review*, 2011: 439-462.

⁹Ibid, p.443

¹⁰Ibid, p.443

high risk of regime instability by the presence of foreign humanitarian aid because of the nature of its authoritarian military regime¹¹. In his research, Paik, gave a very significant theoretical devise to which one can determine if a certain authoritarian regime would accept humanitarian assistance. An authoritarian regime would less likely to accept humanitarian foreign aid if the risk in regime instability is high and the need for foreign aids are low¹². The research done by Paik incites a good understanding on how recipient states react towards donor states humanitarian aid. The theoretical devise which was given helps further understand the mentality of authoritarian regimes, and how it perceives international cooperation. Likewise the research gives an understanding on how disaster affects politics, and vice-versa.

Literature Review on United States – Philippine relations

In understanding US-Philippine relations one has to look back at history. As a starting point, Golay gives an old-fashioned description of the colonial history of the Philippine under the United States.¹³ With most of the data coming from the United States, Golay points out the colonial mentality of the United States, and how it contradicted itself with the practice of colonizing the Philippines. In a similar fashion, Salamanca, writes about the reaction of the Filipino elites from 1901-1913 towards American rule.¹⁴ In his book, Salamanca emphasized that the Filipino elites, especially the conservative-nationalists, already had a vision of their own for the country, however, still collaborated with the American rule to protect their vested interest. These two books give a side by side perspective between the early beginnings of US-Philippine relations. However, its focus on history allows the reader to a mere description of the picture.

In a more in depth analysis of US-Philippine relations, Feeney has looked into the situation of the US military bases in the Philippines during the Marcos regime.¹⁵ In his findings, the United States was in a dilemma of maintaining or closing down its bases in the Philippines

¹¹Ibid, p.443

¹²Ibid, p.440

¹³ Golay, Frank. *Face of Empire: United States - Philippine Relations, 1896-1946*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1998.

¹⁴ Salamanca, Bonifacio. *Filipino Reaction to American Rule, 1901-1913*. Hamden: Shoe String Press, 1968.

¹⁵Feeney, William. "The United States and the Philippines: The Bases Dilemma." *Asian Affairs*, 1984: 63-85.

after signing the 1983 Memorandum of Agreement for the extension of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947 because of the growing political and economic instability in the Philippines during the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos. The significance of Feeney's study is manifested by giving insights on the negotiations between Manila and Washington towards establishing a more stable democratic post-Marcos regime, and the continued presence of US military bases even after Marcos.

Though the United States were able to retain the bases after the Marcos dictatorship, the momentum of Filipino nationalist sentiments was still obvious and there was still a wide range cry for the permanent removal of US bases. In a collection of interviews, and speeches, University of the Philippines professor Roland Simbulan gives a picture of the ongoing struggle for the Philippines to achieve an independent foreign policy primarily by taking over the US bases in the archipelago¹⁶. He asserts that it is in the Philippine's national interest to assert and advance an independent foreign policy as mandated by the 1987 constitution. Furthermore, he gave importance to the avoidance of war by canceling the bases negotiations between the Philippines and the United States¹⁷. These collected works of Simbulan reflects the growing nationalism that has spurred Filipinos even after the fall of the Marcos regime. However, what Simbulan did not quite saw in his works was the fact that there are also external factors that can intertwine with the domestic situation in the Philippines.

The external factor towards US-Philippine relations, particularly towards the maintenance of the bases was carefully illustrated by Paez, in her 1985 work¹⁸. In her book, "*The Bases Factor: Realpolitik of RP-US Relations*" she carefully illustrates the vitality of the bases in the Philippines for the United States. In giving both the anti and pro US bases sentiments within the US government, Paez was able to synthesize a realist assumption that the US should let go of the bases particularly because its usefulness has been diminished since the end of the Cold War¹⁹, and a continued presence would not be cheap²⁰, likewise, the United States will might find itself

¹⁶ Simbulan, Roland. *The Continuing Struggle for an Independent Philippine Foreign Policy*. Manila: Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition, 1991.

¹⁷Ibid, p. 25

¹⁸ Paez, Patricia Ann. *The Bases Factor: Realpolitik of RP-US Relations* . Manila: Dispatch Press, 1985.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 129

²⁰ Ibid, p. 135

trapped within the domestic upheavals inside the Philippines, which would restrict US military freedom of action²¹.

Sugai (2009) talks about the “recalibration” of US-Philippine alliance after the closure of the US bases in 1991²². Going against previous scholars claim that the bases closure was the end of the security relations between the United States and the Philippines, she argued that there was instead a restructuring of the alliance that would suit both the external and domestic environment during the that time. With the end of the Cold War, plus the enthusiast Filipino nationalist movement, both the United States and the Philippines had restructured their alliance in a way that will suit the demands of the time.

Literature Review on Alliances

The topic about alliances has been one of the most thought areas in the realist school of International Relations. Putting it in simple terms, states seek alliance to enhance their defense capabilities. In his book “*Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*,” George Liska (1968), talks about the limitations of cohesion between an alliance. He argues that it is not wise to assume that a particular measure of integration between allies will increase cohesion, because it will obstruct members to pursue national-security interests²³. Liska further argues that in a world of nations, the needs of security must struggle with those of independent status and domestic stability.²⁴

In testing the limits of an alliance, Victor Cha (2000), has made a seminal work on how a common third party ally affects the level of cooperation between non-allied states. Giving the case of South Korea and Japan, he argues that the inclination of these countries toward their common great power ally – the United States and its security commitments, directly influences

²¹ Ibid, p. 139. This was one of the counter-rebuttal of Rear Adm (ret.) Gene R. La Roque, one of the staunch supporter and advocate of the closure of the bases in the Philippines.

²² Surgai, Courtney. *U.S.-Philippine Security Relations after Base Closure (1991-1999)*. Master's Thesis. Hawai'i Pacific University, 2009.

²³ Liska, George. *Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence*. Baltimore: The John S. Hopkins Press, 1968.

²⁴ Ibid, p.116-117

the level of politico-military cooperation between the two quasi allied states²⁵. His findings suggests that quasi allied states – those that have a common patron, fears either abandonment from their common patron state, or being entrapped, in the internal crisis of their quasi ally.

Theoretical Framework

In the study of foreign policy today, it is deviant not to dwell on the role of domestic influences on foreign policy decision making. However, to focus alone on domestic factors lack depth in understanding foreign policy decision since the international system has and needs to be understood to gain a better footing. It is therefore pertinent to look unto the intertwining of both the domestic and external factors and environment to grasp the whole picture into explaining foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, one focal point that the interchange between domestic and external environment happens is the fact that political principles influence both domestic and international politics²⁶.

In explaining the assumptions of the study, this research would utilize the intertwining of domestic and external environment that gave way to compare the different results of two cases under the same given background. Furthermore it would base its theoretical assumptions from Hermann’s model of foreign policy change (1990).



Figure 1. Herrmann's model of foreign policy change

²⁵ Cha, Victor D. "Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United States, Japan, and Korea." *International Studies Quarterly*, 2000: 261-291.

²⁶ Lumsdaine, David. "The Intertwining of International and Domestic Politics." *Polity*, 1996: 299-306.

In Herrmann's model, he gave four primary agents that cause a shift or change of a country's foreign policy. A leader driven change is spearheaded by the top executive in the foreign policy decision making process. It is most of the time the effect of an authoritative policy maker who insists upon his own vision of a new direction of foreign policy²⁷. Meanwhile, a bureaucratic advocacy change is one that is viewed as led by a group within the government²⁸. On the other hand, domestic restructuring refers to politically pertinent segment of society that supports a regime, and this societal agent may likely influence the regime to change its foreign policy directions²⁹. Last, but equally important, external shocks are those causes of foreign policy change that is related to drastic international events³⁰. Herrmann further argues that among the four primary change agents, a combination between two agents is possible, such as when an external shock gives a leader the opportunity to influence a realignment of foreign policy. Furthermore, Herrmann said that environmental conditions such as weather and natural phenomena can serve as a stimulus to examine an existing policy that needs to be changed.

The study would utilize this model in a way to explain the intertwining of external and domestic factors in answering the research question. In doing so, *external shocks* would be considered as a system or external factor, while the rest will be considered by this study as domestic factors. The study would argue that despite the similarity of a disaster background, the US pulled back its troops after Mt. Pinatubo eruption, and then went back to the Philippine bases after typhoon Haiyan because the different interest at those times of the Philippines were a manifestations of a change in foreign policy caused by external shocks (the end of the Cold War during Mt. Pinatubo eruption, and US Pivot to Asia during typhoon Haiyan), and domestic influences (bureaucratic advocacy during the Mt. Pinatubo eruption, and leader driven during typhoon Haiyan). True to the assumptions of Herrmann, the disasters served as a stimulus for reviewing past policies from both the United States and the Philippines. The damages caused by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo to Clark Airbase made the US to think on the sustainability of its bases, given that it no longer serves as a forward base since the Cold War has ended already. Likewise, typhoon Haiyan has made the Philippines rely more on US aid and humanitarian

²⁷ Herrmann, Charles. "When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990: 3-21.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 11-12

²⁹ Ibid, p. 11-12

³⁰ Ibid, p. 11-12

assistance since the US has mobilized a huge amount of military and economic asset to help its treaty ally.

CHAPTER III

FAREWELL...FOR NOW

In 1991, the Senate of the Philippines, with a vote of 12 to 11, rejected a new treaty that will allow the United States to remain at its military bases in the archipelago for another 10 years³¹. This vote by the Senate marks the end of the presence of the US bases in the Philippines. The different factors that influenced this decision ranges from a variety of reasons, which includes, but are not limited to the momentum of Filipino nationalism as emboldened by the recent People Power revolution³², the destruction caused by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption³³, and the end of the Cold War which begs the question of the usefulness of the bases³⁴. Though these factors have a certain impact on the decision of the Philippine Senate to reject another US treaty, the research would focus on the end of the Cold War and the upbeat of Filipino domestic politics as external and domestic influences that affected Foreign Policy changes. This chapter will consist of three sub-chapters. First would be a detailed discussion of the bases dilemma the United States is facing after the end of the Cold War, and how it affected the Philippines decision to remove the US bases. The second part would illustrate how Filipino nationalist movements lobbied in the senate and influenced the senators to vote against another treaty with the United States.

US Bases Dilemma: End of the Cold War, End of business?

The 1947 Military Bases Agreement (MBA) between the United States and the Philippines gave the former the right to use sixteen military bases in the Philippines, which includes Subic Bay Naval Base, and Clark Airbase. These two bases are particularly of strategic

³¹ Shenon, Philip. *Philippine Senate Votes to Reject U.S. Base Renewal*. September 16, 1991. <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/16/world/philippine-senate-votes-to-reject-us-base-renewal.html> (accessed November 15, 2016).

³² Simbulan, Roland. *The Continuing Struggle for an Independent Philippine Foreign Policy*. Manila: Nuclear Free Philippines Coalition, 1991.

³³ Gaillard, Jean-Christophe, Ilan Kelman, and Ma. Fiorina Orillos. "US-Philippines Military Relations After the Mt Pinatubo Eruption in 1991: A Disaster Diplomacy Perspective." *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 2009: 301-330.

³⁴ Paez, Patricia Ann. *The Bases Factor: Realpolitik of RP-US Relations*. Manila: Dispatch Press, 1985.

importance for both the United States and the Philippines for certain reasons. First, it guarantees the security of the Philippines from external attack; second, it grants the Philippines as well as other friendly nations in Southeast Asia to engage in economic growth without restricting military expenditures; third, it balances against Soviet military schemes in Southeast Asia; fourth, it promotes stability in the South China Sea region; and fifth, it allows the US the capacity to project its military prowess swiftly into both the Pacific and Indian Ocean³⁵. In an interview with James T. L. Dandridge in April 2003, former Public Affairs Officer in the Philippines from 1984 to 1987, Herwald Morton illustrated the strategic value of Subic Bay and Clark Field to US military operations³⁶. Regarding Subic Bay he said:

“Subic has a huge natural harbor that is large enough so that aircraft carrier can turn around within the harbor itself and with float and dry dock facilities. There were recreational facilities there for the Seventh Fleet. So they could come in and the troops could have, if they really wanted to, they could stay on base without going into the community. There were lighted baseball diamonds that were open 24 hours, bowling alleys and horseback riding and golf course and there was a little island off the coast. They could go out swimming and scuba-diving or whatever. It was really a great place. They had several PXs and commissaries and it was a self-contained city.³⁷”

With regards to the relevance of Clark Airfield, former Defense Department Counselor to the Philippines from 1981-1984, Philip Merrill said:

“We had the only real bombing range in the entire Pacific, Clark Air Force Base, and we had a huge naval shipyard at Subic Bay. Bombing ranges are much more complicated than anybody realizes. A place to test fighters and bombers is a big deal. You don’t just tow targets and shoot at them. It has to be calibrated, and the testing facilities are very complex. Airplanes from all over the Far East, from Thailand and Japan and South Korea and Taiwan relied on Clark³⁸”

³⁵ Gregor, James. "The Key Role of U.S. Bases in the Philippines." *The Heritage Foundation*. January 10, 1984. <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/1984/01/the-key-role-of-us-bases-in-the-philippines> (accessed November 15, 2016).

³⁶ See Baroody, Judith. "Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History: Politics, Pinatubo and the Pentagon: The Closure of Subic Bay." *Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*. n.d. <http://adst.org/2016/05/politics-pinatubo-pentagon-closure-subic-bay-philippines/> (accessed November 15, 2016).

³⁷ Morton, Herwald, interview by James T.L. Dandridge. *Strategic Value of Subic Bay and Clark Field to American Military Operations* (April 2003).

³⁸ Merrill, Philip, interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy. *U.S. - Philippines Negotiations* (January 1997).




Figure 2. Map of Central Luzon Island in the Philippines showing the location of Subic Bay and Clark Airfield

With the facilities and geostrategic location of both Subic Bay and Clark Airfield, the United States was taking the most out of the Military Bases Agreement with a rent free use of these bases. However, the usefulness of the bases came into question when the Cold War ended, and as some analysts and US government officials would say, the retention of the Bases after the Cold War would be expensive and irrelevant³⁹.

It is noteworthy to say that during the Cold War, it was a common perception in the United States both in the general public, and in the government that the bases in the Philippines were a vital part of the initiative to contain Soviet military power in the Far East. Yet despite this perception, a report published by the Cato Institute for Foreign Policy Briefing in 1991 stated that the vast distance of the Philippines has proven to give only a marginal role in Washington's security strategy⁴⁰. More so, the perception that the bases in the Philippines were crucial for the protection of Japan and South Korea has been increasingly detached from actuality for two reasons. First, the substantial internal economic and political upheavals of the Soviet Union have extremely made them less capable of pursuing an expansionist spree in the Far East⁴¹. Second, in a speech on July 1986, Mikhael Gorbachev signaled the Soviet Union's aim of establishing

³⁹ Paez, Patricia Ann. *The Bases Factor: Realpolitik of RP-US Relations*. Manila: Dispatch Press, 1985., Baroody, Judith. "Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History: Politics, Pinatubo and the Pentagon: The Closure of Subic Bay." *Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training*. n.d. <http://adst.org/2016/05/politics-pinatubo-pentagon-closure-subic-bay-philippines/> (accessed November 15, 2016).

⁴⁰ Carpenter, Ted Galen. *The U.S. Military Presence in the Philippines: Expensive and Unnecessary*. Cato Institute, 1991.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 2

economic ties with its Asian neighbors⁴². This particularly means mending relations with the People's Republic of China; pressing Vietnam to go out of Cambodia; pulling out its own troops from Mongolia; and more importantly, seeking rapprochement with South Korea, and Japan. Because of these reasons, as the peril of Soviet aggression has diminished, the capacity of Japan, and South Korea to defend themselves has expanded.⁴³ The bases in the Philippines has only maintained its status as a symbol of US colonialism, and even in the most conflictual moments of the Cold War, it has never been considered as a vital aspect of US defense strategy. More so, as a symbol of US imperialism, the bases in the Philippines are a ticking time bomb, especially with the communist party New People's Army (NPA) painting it as proof that President Corazon Aquino is no different to President Marcos as a US puppet⁴⁴. For these reasons, and other domestic factors inside the Philippines, it is wise to think that US withdrawal is beneficial to both countries. The culmination of all these factors for withdrawal was the Philippine Senate decision in 1991 to reject a renewal of the bases agreement. This event signaled the end of the military presence of the United States in the Philippines for a short period of time, and was greatly influenced by a myriad of domestic political factors.

The Domestic Politics of the Philippines

After the removal of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos from the presidency, the Philippine socio-political arena remained interesting and cunning as usual. Coup attempts were on a rampage both from Marcos loyalists and military officers who believes that Corazon Aquino was unfit for the presidency⁴⁵. Republic Act 7160, or the 1991 Local Government Code, was passed by Congress which decentralized the administration of local governments, and gave more autonomy to the Muslim Mindanao Region and the Cordilleras up in the northern mountains of Luzon⁴⁶. The long sleeping volcano, Mt. Pinatubo erupted in 1991 which led to a devastating

⁴² Ibid, p. 2. See Soviet Daily Press, July 29, 2986, pp. 16-18

⁴³ Ibid, p.2. Japan has the world's second largest economy, and though it has a small military establishment, a modest increase in Tokyo's military budget will lead to a potential deterrent force within a short span of time. Likewise, South Korea has twice the population and possibly nine times the GNP of North Korea, the only conceivable threat to its security, and can definitely provide for its own defense.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 5

⁴⁵ The New York Times. *Philippine Coup Attempts*. December 1, 1989. <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/01/world/philippine-coup-attempts.html> (accessed December 28, 2016).

⁴⁶ Brillantes, Alex Jr. B. "The Philippines in 1991: Disasters and Decisions." *Asian Survey*, 1992: 140-145.

casualties and loss in the Central Plains of Luzon. In the field of foreign relations, in 1991, 12 senators voted to reject the renewal of the treaty bases between the United States and the Philippines, thus ending American presence in the archipelago⁴⁷.

The decision of the Philippine Senate to reject the bases has a lot of different explanations and illusions. Some articles would argue that the damage caused by Mt. Pinatubo in Clark Air base paved the way for the closure and total lack of interest of the United States in the Philippines. However, true to the findings of Gaillard, Kelman, and Orillos, the eruption was not a vital factor, but rather an incidental catalyst to the ongoing debate of the maintenance of the bases⁴⁸. Aside from the external influence of the end of the Cold War, the domestic politics within the Philippine bureaucracy, particularly in the Senate and in the Department of Foreign Affairs were the more apparent reason for the rejection of the renewal of the US bases. Three domestic reasons will be explained by this research. First was the uneasy negotiation between Manila and Washington. Second was the staunch anti-Marcos senators who saw the US as a supporter of the past Marcos regime. Third was the upsurge of nationalist Filipino sentiments that, like the senators, saw the US as a Marcos ally, and therefore impinging on the sovereignty of the Philippines.

Uneasy Negotiations, Hardliners, and Ambitions

In 1988 a review was conducted by both the Philippines, and the United States of America of the Military Bases Agreement (MBA), and the two countries concluded that the bases in the Philippines should be terminated by the year 1991. However, the United States saw it fit to draft a new treaty, the “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation” which would basically extend the base in Subic Bay in exchange for economic aid and external protection from the United States. Though the United States would still prefer to maintain its base in the Philippines, at the back of the head of every think tank in Washington, the retention of the bases

⁴⁷12 out of 23 senators voted to reject the renewal of US bases. The senators were: Agapito "Butz" Aquino, Joseph Estrada, Teofisto Guingona Jr, Sotero Laurel II, Ernesto Maceda Jr, Orlando Mercado, Aquilino Pimentel Jr, Rene Saguisag, Jovito Salonga, Wigberto Tañada, Victor Ziga, and Juan Ponce Enrile.

⁴⁸Gaillard, Jean-Christophe, Ilan Kelman, and Ma. Fiorina Orillos. "US-Philippines Military Relations After the Mt Pinatubo Eruption in 1991: A Disaster Diplomacy Perspective." *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 2009: 301-330.

would be expensive and useless. In a report published by the RAND National Defense Research Institute in 1989, it has concluded that the bases in the Philippines were not irreplaceable, and supporting findings by the Cato Institute of Foreign Policy Briefing suggested that maintaining the bases were indeed expensive, and irrational⁴⁹. Though given these findings, the United States opted to delegate the task of head negotiator to Richard Armitage, a hardliner who, according to the words of a former senior political consultant to the Philippine Senate “wanted to maximize the gains of the United States without making a commitment in black and white⁵⁰.” This means that the United States wanted to maintain the bases, yet they opted not to mention any figures or amounts that will be given to the Philippines for economic aid as compensation. Alongside the opportunistic intentions of the United States was the ambition of the lead negotiator for the Philippines, Raul Manglapus the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. Manglapus was, in the words of former US Ambassador to the Philippines Richard H. Solomon, “pulled between his responsibilities as Foreign Minister and the forces of Philippine nationalism⁵¹.” Manglapus was eyeing a bid as Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which he needed the support of the United States, which is why he maintained a hesitant posture while negotiating with Washington. The new treaty was then passed to the verdict of the Philippine Senate as it is required by the Philippine Constitution. The hardline stance of Armitage, plus the ambivalent character of Manglapus surely gave the Philippine Senate an initial idea of how opportunistic and one sided the new treaty was. Because of these reasons, plus the sentiments of the senators themselves, the new treaty was rejected by the Senate in an overwhelming majority vote.

The Senate Votes to Reject the US bases

In a vote of 12 out of 23 senators, the Philippine Senate has rejected the proposed Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation by the United States to renew the bases in the Philippines. This decision was monumental for the Philippines as it marked the departure of the United States

⁴⁹ Henry, Donald Putnam, Keith Crane, and Katharine Watkins Webb. *The Philippine Bases: Background for Negotiations*. Prepared for the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of State, USA, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporations, 1989., Carpenter, Ted Galen. *The U.S. Military Presence in the Philippines: Expensive and Unnecessary*. Cato Institute, 1991.

⁵⁰ Simbulan, Roland, interview by Francis Esteban. Interview with former Philippine Senate Senior Political Consultant, Roland Simbulan (December 12, 2016).

⁵¹ Solomon, Richard H., interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy. *Consequences of the Bases Closure* (September 1996).

from its former colony. The decisions of the senators who voted against the bases were based from different reasons, ranging from the fear of the US bringing nuclear weapons in the bases to the spread of prostitution in the area surrounding the bases⁵². Yet perhaps a more uniting reason for these senators was the unreasonable compensation that the US would pay the Philippines. In fact, in an interview with a former political consultant to the Philippine Senate, Prof. Roland Simbulan said that there was even no specific amount that US stated as compensation for the bases during the negotiation period. This has led the senators to think that Washington is trying to make a fool out of the Philippines, since in comparison to the compensation to the bases in Korea and Japan; the numbers were at least stated in black and white. A more political reason behind was the fact that the United States supported the Marcos regime, and most of the senators after the Martial Law era was part of the opposition against Marcos, some of them were even detained and tortured. This gave the senators an insight that the US was not really aiming towards building better democratic institutions in the Philippines because if so, they would not have supported the Marcos dictatorship. This prompted the senators to carefully study the real intentions of the US, because if Washington would really want to promote democracy in the region, then they should have been critical of Marcos, but instead they supported the dictator because of fear that Marcos could have the bases in jeopardy of leaving. Given this background plus the personal vendettas of the senators towards Marcos, the senators became critical of the proposed treaty to extend the bases agreement, and subsequently led them to reject it.

The Upsurge of Filipino Nationalism

The EDSA People Power I Revolution gave Philippine society a momentum boost towards nationalism. Ousting a dictator through a peaceful popular revolution had made the world looked into the Philippines as a model of peaceful power transition, which in a complementary way gave the Philippines pride as a nation. After the Marcos regime, the momentum of Filipino nationalism was still evident as there were a growing number of anti US bases movements which in a way lobbied for the senate rejection of the new bases agreement. Likewise, it is noteworthy that even some of the senators that rejected the new base agreement

⁵² Meruñas, Mark. *20 years later, senators who rejected US bases hailed anew*. September 16, 2011. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/232573/news/nation/20-years-later-senators-who-rejected-us-bases-hailed-anew> (accessed January 6, 2017).

were part of these anti bases movements. But perhaps the most appalling reason for this anti bases movement was the fact that President Corazon Aquino herself led a demonstration movement in favor of the US bases. This was a big slap in the face for the other side of Filipino nationalists, which after ousting a dictator that was supported by the US which eventually led to the rise of Mrs. Aquino; the latter now calls on the people to support the renewal of the bases in the Philippines. No wonder why even the military thought that Mrs. Aquino was unfit to be president and plotted many coup attempts towards her presidency. Though the vote in the Philippine Senate was the main reason for the rejection of the bases, the upsurge and momentum of Filipino Nationalism was one of the driving forces alongside others, which strengthened the views and opinions of the senators that the US was not in the Philippines to promote democracy, but to maintain its colonial status – to make the Philippines a springboard for future operations in the region, thus impinging on Philippine sovereignty. In the end, the senators were thinking that by rejecting the new bases agreement they would be promoting and protecting the sovereignty of the Philippines. Though at that moment it was true, but the US was not yet finished with its schemes to have a military presence in the Philippines.

The Intertwining of External and Domestic Influence

The theoretical framework of this research mainly draws its strengths from Herrmann's model of foreign policy change. The model stresses that there are four main agents that drives foreign policy change: leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shocks⁵³. Herrmann claims that these agents can interact with each other to influence a foreign policy change on a more obvious way.

In the case of the Philippines rejecting the new treaty of the United States to renew the bases, one can see how Manila changed its foreign policy directives by the influence mainly of two change agents: the external shock which was the end of the Cold War, and the bureaucratic advocacy which is the domestic influence of the Philippine Senate. The intertwining of these two factors can be easily explained as a chain of events. Because of the end of the Cold War, the United States was in a dilemma whether to maintain the bases in the Philippines. Because of this

⁵³ Herrmann, Charles. "When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy." *International Studies Quarterly*, 1990: 3-21.

dilemma, Washington opted to negotiate with the Philippines with very vague and ambiguous terms to the point that there was no clear amount stated for the compensation of the renewal of the bases. Hence, the Philippine senate became critical of the intention of the US to the Philippines. Recent memories of Washington's support to Marcos were then revived, and the question of whether the US was really towards promoting democracy or promoting its interest was raised. In so, history was made and the Philippine Senate rejected the treaty for the renewal of the US bases.

The change of foreign policy of Manila towards the US bases was evidently explained by the influence of both external and domestic factors. Because of these factors, the United States went out of the Philippines, but not permanently. Years after the departure of the last US warship from Subic bay, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was signed which allowed the United States military to train with the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Decades after the monumental senate rejection of the US bases, Washington would once again have a presence in Philippine military bases through the EDCA. The irony, and the surprise is that external and domestic factors again influenced Manila to sign an agreement which would technically allow the US to go back again in Philippine military bases.

CHAPTER IV

HERE AND BACK AGAIN

When the last American warship went out of Subic Bay after the Philippine senate rejected to renew the base, many Filipinos thought that it would be the last time they will see American forces in the archipelago. However, that did not happen. Seven years after, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was signed by Washington, and Manila allowing American forces to visit the Philippines and train with the AFP. The VFA granted US troops to enter the Philippines visa-free, and with distinct privileges⁵⁴. Fast forward to recent events, in 2014, Manila and Washington signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) as an implementing framework for the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the VFA. Under EDCA, US military will be allowed, with regulations to use agreed upon areas of facilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines⁵⁵. Given the frameworks of both the VFA and EDCA, one can see that the United States, virtually, did not leave the Philippines after 1991. What is more interesting is that like the previous case, external, and domestic factors have once again influenced Philippine foreign policy decision making, especially with regards to EDCA. This chapter will focus on explaining how an external factor such as US Pivot to Asia Policy, and domestic factors in the Philippines such as President Benigno Aquino's vocal support of military modernization, and the tragedy that is typhoon Haiyan, paved the way for Manila to once again solidify US presence in the Philippines through EDCA.

⁵⁴ According to Article IV of VFA, "1.Philippine authorities shall accept as valid, without test or fee, a driving permit or license issued by the appropriate United States authority to United States personnel for the operation of military or official vehicles. 2.Vehicles owned by the Government of the United States need not be registered, but shall have appropriate markings." For further information on the privileges of American Troops under the VFA See <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107852.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Amador, Julio III S. "Eyes on the Prize? Philippines-US Alliance and Defense Modernization." *CIRSS Commentaries*, 2014.

The “Rebalance of Asia” and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement

In 2011, President Barack Obama announced his “pivot” to Asia or a shift of US foreign policy efforts from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. This Asian rebalance has been formulated for the purpose of keeping a watchful eye on the rise of China by increasing the “institutional weight,” “power projection” and “deterrence capacity” of American forces in the region⁵⁶. As the oldest Asian ally of the United States, the Philippines has always been supportive of American foreign policies, which is why it is not surprising that Manila would support Washington’s initiative in the region. During the 60th anniversary of the US-Philippine Mutual defense Treaty on November 16, 2011, the Philippines officially expressed its commitment to support US Pivot to Asia through the Manila Declaration of 2011⁵⁷. The Manila Declaration of 2011 openly reiterates the common obligations of the two countries as it says:

“The Republic of the Philippines and the United States today reaffirm our shared obligations under the Mutual Defense Treaty. We expect to maintain a robust, balanced, and responsive security partnership including cooperating to enhance the defense, interdiction, and apprehension capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. We are determined to continue our bilateral cooperation in addressing broader regional and global challenges, including maritime security and threats to security such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and transnational crime. We are committed to continuing our close and effective cooperation to counter al-Qaida-linked terrorist groups in the southern Philippines. We share a common interest in maintaining freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and transit of people across the seas and subscribe to a rules-based approach in resolving competing claims in maritime areas through peaceful, collaborative, multilateral, and diplomatic processes within the framework of international law.”⁵⁸”

The Manila Declaration has been the starting point of the Philippines role in playing a part in America’s strategic foreign policy shift. As a small power, an enhancement in the defense treaty between Manila and Washington would serve the interest of the Philippines to obtain better minimum defense credibility, especially that the security concern of the Philippines is gradually

⁵⁶ Banlaoi, Rommel C. "The Philippines and U.S. Pivot to Asia." *11th Symposium of the Council for Asian Transnational Threat Research (CATR)*. Bangkok: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, 2012. 1-5.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ "Signing of the Manila Declaration On Board the USS Fitzgerald in Manila Bay, Manila, Philippines." *U.S. Department of State*. November 16, 2011. <https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/11/177226.htm> (accessed January 12, 2017).

shifting its attention from domestic separatists movements in the south, to territorial defense. Enhanced defense cooperation from a superpower ally, plus the attention that the latter is giving in the region would give Manila the opportunity not only to boost its territorial defense measures, but also train and modernize its own military. Because of the growing tension in the region, the Philippines would need a strong balancing leverage, especially in dealing its territorial disputes with the regional powerhouse that is China. In foreign policy literatures, a small power can either bandwagon with big power in times of misunderstanding, or enhanced its alliance with another big power to balance the other. Corollary to this assumption, global circumstances catalyzes the efforts of a small power to either bandwagon or balance against the bigger state⁵⁹.

Aside from traditional security issues, non-traditional ones are also on the focal point of U.S. Pivot to Asia strategy. In the wake of typhoon Haiyan which struck the central islands of the Philippines, US military and civilian personnel were among the first one to respond, and the massive amount of US donations and aids were a manifestation that Washington is in serious business of mobilizing massive assets both in military and diplomatic ways to help its Asian allies in need. It is why no wonder that even former Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario, said in an interview with a local media organization that the US presence in the relief operations after typhoon Haiyan is a proof that the Philippines needs to enhance defense cooperation with Washington.

Under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines, and the United States, both countries have the responsibility for interoperability and cooperation in upgrading and modernizing the two countries' defense capability. Former Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin points out that primarily, the MDT was conceived as an agreement to address external threats during the time of the Cold War. Subsequent agreements under the framework of

⁵⁹ De Castro, Renato Cruz. "The 21st Century Philippine-U.S. Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA): The Philippines' Policy in Facilitating the Obama Administrations's Strategic Pivot to Asia." *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 2014: 427-446.

the MDT such as the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the EDCA were made to address the changing tides of security issues⁶⁰

A thorough understanding of EDCA would lead one to notice that it coincides with the US pivot to Asia policy, and can be considered as the Philippines part of supporting Washington's strategic plan in Asia. In a brief published by the United States Congressional Research Service, it stresses how the Philippines will play a role in the Obama administration's "rebalance" of Asia as one of the key sectors of policy concern. Under EDCA, rotational presence of US forces in the Philippines will be implemented, and the US would be able to utilize Philippine owned facilities on a rent-free basis. More than so, the EDCA aims to develop opportunities for bilateral training and to support the long-term modernization of the AFP⁶¹.

It can be certain that in ways more than one, the US pivot to Asia policy influenced the Philippines to negotiate the EDCA. As a small power in a geostrategic location in the Asia-Pacific region, it is in the Philippines' interest to enhance its defense cooperation with a superior ally. Given the circumstances of an external factor initiated by the superpower ally, the Philippines was in a position of obtaining surplus defense capability, though it is in exchange for the US to dominate the alliance⁶². Before the Obama administration's pivot to Asia, the military relationship between Manila and Washington was mainly focused on internal security and counterterrorism activities in Southern Philippines. However, since the announcement of Obama's rebalance of Asia, the Philippine government, through the AFP released the Internal Peace and Security Plan with a goal of modernizing the Armed Forces in a 6 years framework to gradually shift from internal defense to territorial defense in order to promote more than just national security, but human security as well⁶³. Obviously, the rebalance of Asia strategy of the U.S, made the Philippines intensify its military modernization and both U.S. and Philippine

⁶⁰ Gazmin, Voltaire. "Speech on the Signing of the Agreement on Enhanced Defense Cooperation Between the Philippines and the United States of America." *Department of National Defense*. April 28, 2014. <http://dnd.gov.ph/pdf/snd%20statement%20on%20edca.pdf> (accessed February 8, 2017).

⁶¹ The White House. "Fact Sheet: United States-Philippines Bilateral Relations." 2014.

⁶² See Snyder, Glenn H. "Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut." *Journal of International Affairs*, 1990: 103-123.

⁶³ Armed Forces of the Philippines. *Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan*. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2010.

officials said that the EDCA would be a conduit of the said modernization⁶⁴. Theoretical strengths of this case lie in the work of Herrmann (1990), which suggests that external factors can redirect a country's foreign policy directives. However, it is not only the external factor that influenced the Philippines to negotiate with EDCA. Domestic influences like President Aquino's vocal support of military modernization, plus the experiences from typhoon Haiyan is also a subject that must be studied for their influence. The subsequent part of this chapter will carefully discuss how these domestic factors played their part in the decision making process.

Military Modernization and Disaster Response

The U.S. Pivot as an external influence was not the only one that affected the decision of the Philippines to negotiate the EDCA. Domestic and local factors had an equal if not more surpassing influence on the side of Manila to consider having an enhanced defense cooperation with Washington. The leader driven factor change as suggested by Herrmann points out how a certain major stake holder in foreign policy decision making can influence a shift of foreign policy directives. This serves to be the case during the time of President Benigno Aquino, when he openly support and execute the military modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a way to modernize the AFP, the Philippines obviously needs the support of the United States, hence it is stated in the EDCA that it aims to help the Philippines modernize its military both in hardware and in training.

Another internal factor was the disaster response in the aftermaths of typhoon Haiyan. The United States was the second biggest aid donor in the relief operations and had in fact mobilized an aircraft carrier from Japan to help in the disaster response. Because of the tremendous military and civilian response of the United States in the aftermaths of typhoon Haiyan, former Foreign Affairs secretary Albert Del Rosario even said that it is obvious that the Philippines needs to have an enhanced defense cooperation with the U.S. to address the issues of

⁶⁴ Lum, Thomas, and Ben Dolven. *The Republic of the Philippines and U.S. Interests - 2014*. Congressional Research, Congressional Research Service, 2014., Department of National Defense. *Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement*. Press Release, Manila: Department of National Defense, 2014.

natural disaster, and disaster response management. True to those statements, it is written in the EDCA that the enhanced cooperation between Manila and Washington would not only focus on modernizing the military but in training and preparing them to respond effectively and efficiently in disaster management. Parts of this chapter would then discuss these two domestic influences specifically, and analyze how such factors affected the decision of the Philippines to come in terms with EDCA.

Modernizing the Armed Forces: from Internal to Territorial Security

In his first State of the Nation Address (SONA), President Benigno Aquino stated the modernization of the military as one of his priority policies, and his subsequent SONAs have reported the progress that his administration has done to address the issue. In modernizing the military, the Philippine government has bought military hard wares from countries such as the United States and Korea. More so, the Aquino administration had also allocated a total of 28 Billion Pesos (560 Million USD), for the operation and realization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Modernization Program⁶⁵. President Aquino also stated that there had been a green light for the 30 Million U.S. Dollar fund that the United States would provide for the Defense Capability Upgrade and Sustainment of Equipment Program of the AFP⁶⁶. This means to say that the effort of President Aquino to modernize the Armed Forces has the support and backing of the United States.

In response to the instructions of President Aquino to modernize the military, the AFP has released the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) with a plan time framework of 6 years. Stated in IPSP are the plans of the military to gradually shift its focus from internal to territorial security⁶⁷. In shifting its focus to territorial defense, the military has called upon other sectors of Philippine society to commit in ensuring that internal security would still be intact, and human security would as well be achieved. However, for the military to shift to territorial defense, it has to at least have a minimum defense credibility posture, and one way to achieve this is by modernization. The IPSP together with the policy thrusts of the Department of National Defense

⁶⁵ Aquino, Benigno III. "Third State of the Nation Address." Quezon City, 2012.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Armed Forces of the Philippines. *Armed Forces of the Philippines Internal Peace and Security Plan*. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, 2010.

(DND) recognized that among other ways of modernization, enhanced defense cooperation with the United States would come in handy⁶⁸.

Foreign Affairs experts in the Philippines also affirm that military modernization should come hand in hand with an enhanced cooperation with the United States. Julio Amador III, Deputy Director-General of the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in Manila explained that the Philippines must not be reluctant in attaining credible defense posture and a modern military which is at par with other regional players⁶⁹. Furthermore, regarding maintaining enhanced cooperation with the US while modernizing, he said:

“Self-help remains to be the name of the game in international security but assistance from allies and other strategic partners should not be rejected but instead used judiciously while the modernization process is underway. Hypothetical questions such as whether the US will come to the defense of the Philippines if the latter is attacked by an external party may make for good conversation pieces, but they miss out on the real objective: a strong, capable, and modern AFP that can exert a defensive⁷⁰.”

In stressing the role of Philippine strategic culture in the modernization of the military, Renato C. De Castro, a professor of International Studies in De La Salle University – Manila, pointed that Aquino’s effort to modernize the military is still rather a continuation of the country’s strategic culture of depending in the United States for external security. Though he commends the modernization priority of the Aquino administration, he argued that it will only achieve a minimum defense capability, and defense expenditure is still under rough waters from the budget of Congress⁷¹. This means that even if the modernization heeds its goals, the Philippines will still have to rely on the United States, as a major ally, for reasons that it is embedded in the strategic culture of the Philippines to allocate external defense to alliances as shaped by the country’s history and experiences⁷². It further means that modernizing the military should come hand in hand with an enhance defense cooperation with a major ally to address external security issues.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Amador, Julio III S. "Eyes on the Prize? Philippines-US Alliance and Defense Modernization." *CIRSS Commentaries*, 2014.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ De Castro, Renato Cruz. "Philippine Strategic Culture: Continuity in the Face of Changing Regional Dynamics." *Contemporary Security Policy*, 2014.

⁷² Ibid.

The issue of modernizing the military, especially that President Aquino was enthusiast of accelerating it affected the Philippines to sign the EDCA. In an interview with former Undersecretary Laura Del Rosario of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), she stated that EDCA serves a wide range of regional development within the aspect of Philippine-U.S. relations, and one of which is military modernization⁷³. This means that the crucial need for a credible external defense of the Philippines by modernizing its Armed Forces gave the United States something to sell so that in return, it can strengthen and widen its Pivot to Asia Policy.

This case can further strengthen the assumption of an asymmetric model of alliance. According to James D. Morrow (1991), an asymmetrical alliance can be defined as “one partner receives autonomy benefits, and the other, security benefits from the alliance (p.904)⁷⁴.” Clearly, the entirety of U.S.-Philippine relations is asymmetrical in nature, but what is outstanding with regards to EDCA is that it happened during a time when both the Philippines and the United States needed a boost; the former for territorial security, the later for an invigorated influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Moving forward from this domestic factor, the research would discuss another that influenced the Philippines to agree on EDCA. The events following the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan showcased the Philippines reliance on alliances, not only for external defense, but for disaster response as well.

The catalyzing influence of Typhoon Haiyan

On the fateful day of November 8, 2013, Typhoon Haiyan (local name: Yolanda) had made landfall in the central provinces of the Philippines. The typhoon was recorded as the strongest typhoon that had made landfall in history. The destruction was so massive that relief operations were not fully operational until authorities were able to clear the rubbles and obstacles caused by the storm surges. Most notable among the countries that participated in the relief efforts was the United States. Aside from the fact that US was the second highest aid donor, it

⁷³ Del Rosario, Laura, interview by Francis Esteban. *US-Philippine Relations and EDCA* (January 23, 2017).

⁷⁴ Marrow, James D. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science*, 1991: 904-933.

maintained a large presence of US military troops, and even mobilized an aircraft carrier from Japan to aid in the disaster response⁷⁵. In totality, the United States showcased its military and financial might by aiding the Philippines in the aftermath of typhoon Haiyan. The operation conducted by the US military together with the Armed Forces of the Philippines codenamed “Operation Damayan” showed that the alliance is not only for external defense, but to efficiently address natural disasters as well, a phenomena that is not new to the environment of the Philippines.

Hence, typhoon Haiyan influenced the Philippines to agree on EDCA to help modernize the military, in able to efficiently address the aftermath of disasters. In fact, even former DFA Secretary Albert Del Rosario said in a news interview that the presence of United States military forces in the relief operations prove that the Philippines needs the United States for strengthening its defense capabilities⁷⁶.

However, in an interview with a former DFA official, Laura Del Rosario stated that although Haiyan had an influence in EDCA, it is miniscule in nature⁷⁷. Her statement is aligned with the findings of Gaillard, Kelman, and Orillos (1991), that disasters merely catalyze an ongoing negotiation between two parties⁷⁸. In other words, EDCA might have been agreed upon by the Philippines without typhoon Haiyan, but the disaster made it more obvious for Manila to seek enhanced defense cooperation with the United States. It is for this reason among others, that in article I Section 1 (a) of EDCA it is stated:

“Supporting the Parties’ shared goal of improving interoperability of the Parties’ forces, and for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (“AFP”), addressing short-term capabilities gaps, promoting long-term modernization, and helping maintain

⁷⁵ Cabigao, Fernando Jr., and Charmaine Lirio. *Yolanda's Donors: Who, what, why, how much?* January 15, 2015. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/404740/news/specialreports/yolanda-s-donors-who-what-why-how-much> (accessed February 15, 2017).

⁷⁶ Del Callar, Michaela. *US typhoon aid shows need for greater US military presence - DFA chief.* November 25, 2013. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/337006/news/nation/us-typhoon-aid-shows-need-for-greater-us-military-presence-dfa-chief> (accessed February 15, 2017).

⁷⁷ Del Rosario, Laura, interview by Francis Esteban. *US-Philippine Relations and EDCA* (January 23, 2017).

⁷⁸ Gaillard, Jean-Christophe, Ilan Kelman, and Ma. Fiorina Orillos. "US-Philippines Military Relations After the Mt Pinatubo Eruption in 1991: A Disaster Diplomacy Perspective." *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, 2009: 301-330.

and develop additional maritime security, maritime domain awareness, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities...⁷⁹”

In this sense, typhoon Haiyan is a catalyzing influence for Manila to realize that enhanced defense cooperation with Washington would entail military modernization not just for territorial and external defense, but for disaster response as well. Together, the efforts of President Aquino to implement military modernization, plus the experiences of typhoon Haiyan serves as domestic influence for Manila to decide, as a foreign policy, an enhancement of its defense cooperation with the United States. These two factors are considered domestic influences because they happen within the boundaries of Philippine geopolitical landscape. The following part of this chapter would then serve as synthesis on how external and domestic factors played a role in the foreign policy decision of the Manila.

External and Domestic Trade-off

Recalling the theoretical framework of this research, Herrmann’s model of foreign policy change has four agents, external shock, leader driven, bureaucratic advocacy, and domestic restructuring. In chapter III, the author had explained that the foreign policy decision of the Philippines to expel US forces after 1991 was because of an external shock, which was the end of the Cold War, and domestic factors which were primarily of bureaucratic advocacy in nature because of the anti U.S. sentiments of the Philippine senate. The interplay of the external and domestic influences in this case was illustrated as a chain of events coming from the external down to the domestic.

Using the same theoretical backing of Herrmann’s model of foreign policy change, this chapter again utilized the influence of external and domestic influences on foreign policy changes. In agreeing with the terms of EDCA, Manila amended its foreign policy directives with regards to accepting and accommodating US troops in the archipelago, Arguably, this decision was influenced by both external and domestic factor, the former was the Pivot to Asia policy of the US under President Obama, and the latter was the leader driven initiative of President Aquino to implement and accelerate the modernization of the Armed Forces.

⁷⁹Government of the Republic of the Philippines, Government of the United States of America. "Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America on Enhanced Defense Cooperation." Quezon City, April 28, 2014.

Unlike the previous case, which explained the interplay of external and domestic factors as a chain of events, this case can be explained as the domestic taking opportunity of the external. President Aquino took the advantage of the US Pivot to Asia policy to implement and accelerate the modernization program of the Armed Forces to address territorial defense and disaster response. This means that the EDCA, as a matter of foreign policy choice, was influenced by the domestic factor taking advantage of the external factor. This case further assumes the findings of Morrow that in an asymmetrical alliance; the smaller country would sometimes get the most out of the bigger country as long as it surrenders its autonomy⁸⁰. By agreeing with the terms of EDCA, the Philippine government has surrendered its autonomy of uplifting provisions of its constitution which states that any agreement with other countries should be ratified by the Senate. EDCA was not ratified by the Philippine Senate because it was argued by the cohorts of President Aquino in the executive branch as an executive agreement, not as a treaty, though technically, other agreements of the same nature before were ratified by the Philippine Senate like the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

In summation, the case in this chapter shows that foreign policy decision making of the Philippines, when it comes to security, strongly depends on the external environment of its alliance with the United States. Furthermore, this chapter points out that despite the fact that the US was rejected in 1991 due to the influence of external and domestic factors, it still managed to return, in a way like it never leaved, for reasons that are influenced by external and domestic factors as well. The next chapter would synthesize and conclude this research by explaining further the nature of foreign policy decision making in the Philippines with regards to its security alliance with the United States.

⁸⁰ Marrow, James D. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science*, 1991: 904-933.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The main objective of this research is to specifically explain the foreign policy decision making of the Philippines with regards to two cases that involves its security alliance with the United States. The first case was the removal US military bases in the Philippines through a Senate vote in 1991, while the second case is the agreement signed on 2014 on enhanced defense cooperation (EDCA) that would virtually increase US troops presence in the country. The research tried to explain the cases through the lens of foreign policy analysis using the influence of external and domestic factors. In the first case, an external shock such as the end of the Cold War, and the domestic factor of the senate led anti US sentiments made it possible for Manila to reject another US base in the archipelago. The second case, on the other hand, shows how an external shock such as the US Pivot to Asia policy gave the opportunity for the domestic influence which is President Aquino's implementation and acceleration of the modernization program of the AFP which then eventually led for Manila to agree on EDCA. External and domestic factors in these two cases played a very vital role in influencing the decisions of Manila with regards to its security alliance with the United States. However, what some scholars of US-Philippine security relations neglect to notice is the catalyzing factor of natural disasters in the Philippines. True to the findings of Gaillard, Kelman, & Orillos (2009), disasters can catalyze an ongoing negotiation between two parties and this assumption is very much evident especially in the second case. When typhoon Haiyan struck the central parts of the Philippines, the relief efforts and military presence of the United States, catalyzed Manila's decision to agree on terms with EDCA.

In the process of doing this research, the researcher did not only answer how an external and domestic factor influenced Manila to reject the US bases in 1991, then allowed US troops a rotational presence in 2014. In a careful study of the data and interviews that this research has collected, it is noteworthy to argue that the course of US-Philippine relations, especially in terms of the Philippines' part of the alliance, is of reactionary in nature. The two cases prove that a change in the external environment and in the domestic landscape of Philippine politics, can lead

to shift of foreign policy directives. The removal of the US bases in 1991 was a reaction from the perceived status of the external environment, and the domestic stance of anti US sentiments during that time. Meanwhile, the Philippines agreed on terms with EDCA as a reaction to the need to modernize the military and to take advantage of the US Pivot to Asia. These cases represent the continuity of US-Philippine relations from the post-Cold War era.

The reactionary nature of Philippine foreign policy decision especially on security relations with the United States can be seen as Manila's dependency on Washington for a credible external defense posture. This dependence can trace its roots when the Philippines was under the colonial rule of the United States. During those times, the United States made it sure that the Philippines would rely on them for external defense, so as to use the archipelago as a surveillance state, to check and monitor other Asian regional players⁸¹. It is also no wonder that the strategic culture of the Philippines is very much dependent on the United States for external defense. De Castro (2014) argued that though it is notable that President Benigno Aquino is accelerating the modernization program of the Armed Forces, the Philippines would still very much be dependent in America for an external defense posture⁸². Aside from the historical background, most of Philippine military hard wares and tactics are of US origin and training. For this reasons, one can see that despite rejecting another treaty in 1991, the United States did not, in essence, leaved the Philippines as other agreements were in place and the EDCA being the most recent of them all is also the closest to a full blown US military presence in the Philippines. In an interview with an expert on US-Philippine relations, he said that the Philippines will continue to accommodate the military presence of the United States for reasons of external security, hard wares, and crucially because it is already embedded in the military culture of the AFP to accommodate the United States, since most of the high ranking officials are graduates, and trained in the United States⁸³. This means to say that as long as this strategic culture is embedded, Philippine foreign policy with regards to its security alliance with the United States

⁸¹ McCoy, Alfred W. *Policing America's Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State*. Quezon City: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2011.

⁸² De Castro, Renato Cruz. "Philippine Strategic Culture: Continuity in the Face of Changing Regional Dynamics." *Contemporary Security Policy*, 2014.

⁸³ Simbulan, Roland, interview by Francis Esteban. *Interview with former Philippine Senate Senior Political Consultant, Roland Simbulan* (December 12, 2016).

will be reactionary in nature to the external factors caused by the United States, and how the domestic factors will take an opportunity in it.

As a recommendation, now that the Philippines is under the leadership of Rodrigo Duterte, who openly criticizes the alliance with the United States, it would be wise for other stakeholders in foreign policy decision making to advise the president of how vital the US-Philippine security relations is, especially now that the Asia-Pacific region is overwhelmed with a lot of geopolitical games. In the end, foreign policy decision makers in Manila should remember that the Philippines must ally itself with countries sharing the same values it holds such as democracy, freedom of expression, social justice, and the respect for human rights.

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